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ARGUMENT
POINT I
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES ALLOW FOR AN ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND MONETARY DAMAGES,
The order sought by the appellant which would require him to
convey his land and stock to the respondents in exchange for
$600,000

is consistent with the principles

of equity.

The

purpose of equity is to promote and achieve justice with some
degree of flexibility.
1963).
a

just

McFadzean v. Lohr, 380 P.2d 20 (Col.

Granting the relief sought by the appellant would provide
method

to

address

the

breach

of

contract

by

the

respondents since monetary damages alone would not adequately
compensate him.
Granting the appellant's requested order would not make a new
contract for the parties because it neither adds nor deletes any
terms.

The Court would be enforcing a legally binding contract

in a manner that would provide the appellant with a just remedy
for the respondents1 breach.

The cases cited by the respondents

primarily involved contracts wherein a party was advocating the
addition or deletion of a clause in order to create a binding
contract that otherwise would not have been binding and hence the
court would in effect be making an agreement for the parties.
While there are few reported decisions, courts have granted
orders that combined partial specific performance and monetary
damages in cases involving exchange of land contracts.
In the case of a contract of exchange of real estate
it has been held that the vendee may have a specific
performance of that part of the contract which the

vendor can perform, with compensation for that part
which he cannot perform, the same as in ordinary cases
of real estate.
71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance, Section 19 (1973).
As

a

general

rule, partial

specific

performance

with

an

abatement in the purchase price has been granted in Scile of land
contracts not involving exchanges.
In cases of contracts for the sale of land, where the
vendor is unable to furnish full title to the land as
he contracted for, or there is some deficiency in
quantity or quality, the vendor may elect to take what
title or interest the vendor has and to compel him to
perform to the extent of his ability, with an abatement
from the purchase price to compensate for that
deficiency.
71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance, Section 70 (1973).
Clearly, orders that combine specific performance and damages
or abatement have been granted notwithstanding the variance in
performance it created.

The appellant contends that in those

instances the courts were employing the equitable principle of
achieving

justice

to provide the non-breaching

party with a

proper and just remedy rather than simply limiting him to benefit
of the bargain damages.
In the case at hand, since the court is unable to grant mutual
specific performance, because the respondents can not convey the
ranch

property,

the

court

should

grant

partial

specific

performance with monetary damages.

The exchange of land contract

should be specifically performed

in part so as to order the

appellant to convey his land and stock in exchange for $600,000.

2

No sound reason in equity or legal authority exist to deny such
equitable relief to the non-breaching party.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT HAS NOT ACTED
IN AN INEQUITABLE MANNER.
The appellant has acted in a completely proper manner and the
allegations of inequitable conduct against him by the respondents
are unfounded.

Nothing he ever did or said was misleading

concerning the 80 acres of farm land he agreed to trade.

He

showed the land to Roger Olson and explicitly pointed out the
boundaries

for

the

80

acres.

(Tr.

218) .

There

were

no

misrepresentations by Mr. Barker as to the land or to the water
stock that he agreed to trade to the respondents.

He acted above

board and properly at all times.
The allegations that Olson misrepresented the legal effect of
the earnest money agreement to the respondents obviously did not
involve Mr. Barker and were not done with his knowledge, consent,
or authority.

He would not be bound by such representations.

Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, Inc., 590 P.2d 1261 (Utah
1979) . Furthermore, the evidence at trial strongly questions the
credibility

of

the

respondents1, allegations.

Larry

Francis

testified that after his brother, Howard Francis, got back from
the first visit to the farm they discussed the farm land with
Roger Olson but never stated to him that they felt the facts
concerning the land had been misrepresented.

(Tr. 376) .

In

addition, neither one of them halted the preparation of the
3

closing documents at that time.

It was sometime after the first

visit to the farm (30 days) that they decided not to go ahead
with the transaction.

(Tr. 36; 338; 340). These facts indicate

the farm land had not been misrepresented to them.
The

fact that the respondents believed

the earnest money

agreement was final and legally enforceable is evidenced by their
instructing Mr. Olson to arrange for the closing documents after
the earnest money agreement was executed by them on April 21,
1980.

(Tr. 36; 162; 260-262).

Furthermore, their knowledge that

the earnest money agreement was more than a "work sheet" is
evidenced by a letter Howard Francis wrote to Mr. Barker dated
July 28, 1980, wherein he stated that he was relieved the closing
date had

passed

because,

in their

opinion,

earnest money agreement ineffective.

it rendered

(Ex. 7; Tr. 33).

the
The

letter stated:
[I]t was with some relief to us that you failed to
consummate the transaction by the closing date.
On
all legal transactions we understand "time is of the
essence".
From a legal standpoint we understand it would be an
exercise in futility for you to file an action for
specific performance against us . .
Based on the respondents1 actions and statements, it appears
clear that they appreciated the legal effect of the earnest money
agreement.
The

It was not misrepresented to them.

trial

court

properly

precluded

them

from

introducing

evidence of fraud at trial since they had failed to plead the
defense of fraud with specificity as mandated by Rule 9(b) of the
4

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The rule

states:

"In all

averments of fraud . . . the circumstances constituting fraud . .
shall be stated with particularity

. . .."

To meet that

requirement, the allegations of fraud must set forth the substance of the acts constituting the alleged wrong.

Williams v.

State Farm Insurance Company, 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982).
trial court correctly

ruled,

The

in the case at hand, that the

respondents failed to meet that requirement and that the appellant acted properly and with "clean hands" at all times.
POINT III
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL TO DETERMINE
MONETARY DAMAGES.
In the event this Court's review of the law and the facts
determines that the earnest money agreement is a valid contract,
but that it may not be specifically performed, in whole or part,
the appellant is entitled to monetary damages.

To determine an

appropriate damage award, this case should be remanded back to
the trial court for a trial solely on the issue of damages.
rule

otherwise, would

deny

the

appellant

a

remedy

for

To
the

breaching parties actions.
The doctrine of election of remedy does not act as a bar to
Mr. Barker's claim for damages.

The rule is not intended to deny

a remedy to a party, instead its purpose is to prevent a party
from obtaining a double recovery.

Anaelos v. First Interstate

Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983).
5

The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical
rule of procedure .and its purpose is not to prevent
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress
for a single wrong.
Id. at 778.
Clearly, Mr. Barker

is not

seeking

a double

redress for the respondents1 breach of contract.

recovery

or

He does not

want both the remedy of specific performance and the remedy of
loss of the benefit of the bargain damages.

Accordingly, the

doctrine should not bar his claim for damages.

Angelos, supra is

consistent with this interpretation of the doctrine.

The Court

held it inapplicable under the facts because the plaintiff was
not obtaining a double recovery for his claim.

The plaintiff was

entitled to a judgment against one defendant for his claim and he
was entitled to a second judgment against the other defendants
for an amount in excess of the first judgment.
Since the purpose and intent of the doctrine is not violated
by Mr. Barker, in the case at hand, it should not be employed to
unjustly bar his uncompensated

claim for breach of contract.

Moreover, several jurisdictions have held that election of remedy
is not applicable in a lawsuit seeking specific performance or in
the alternative damages.

See, McMahon v. McMahon, 115 S.E. 293

(1922); Abadallah v. Abadallah. 359 F.2d 170 (3rd Cir. 1966).
(It should be noted that none of the cases cited by the respondents

involved an action for specific performance or in the

alternative damages.)

6

The

court

in

McMahon,

supra,

articulately

described

the

doctrine and explained why it was inapplicable to an action for
specific performance or in the alternative damages*
The so-called "inconsistency of remedies" is not an
inconsistency between the remedies themselves, for
this may often happen when the same facts are relied
upon as the basis of the several alternative remedies;
but it means that a certain state of facts relied upon
as the basis of a certain remedy is inconsistent with
and repugnant to another certain state of facts relied
upon as the basis of another remedy. . . .
When a certain state of facts under the law entitles a
party to alternative remedies, both founded upon the
identical state of facts, these remedies are not
considered inconsistent remedies, though they may not
be able to "stand together"; the enforcement of the
one remedy being a satisfaction of the parties claim.
. . . When either party to a contract for the sale of
land has failed in his obligation, the other is
entitled to the alternative remedy of specific
performance in equity or damages at law. They are not
inconsistent remedies, for they each recognize the
validity of the contract, and are based upon the
identical state of facts, the existence of the contract
and its breach. As between themselves they cannot be
said to be consistent, for one seeks to secure the
title to the land and the other proposes to leave the
title with the other party and have compensation in
damages. But the test being as above stated, they are
not considered inconsistent remedies.
Id. at 294-295.
It is the appellant's position that the doctrine of election
of remedy is not applicable to this matter.

Accordingly, the

doctrine should not prevent this Court from remanding for a trial
on damages, nor should

the fact that the appellant did not

introduce evidence of the value of the respondents1
trial.
of

ranch at

His actions should not preclude a new trial on the issue

damages

because

the

trial

court

7

erroneously

denied

the

appellant's
initially

motion

decided

for

a

bifurcated

trial

whether the earnest money

that

would

have

agreement was a

binding contract and if it could be specifically performed and
later, if necessary, a damage award.

Notwithstanding the trial

court's

the

misunderstanding

concerning

status

of

whether

the motion to bifurcate was withdrawn or not, the court had
within its broad powers and discretion the ability to grant the
motion, renewed the morning of the trial, and erroneously failed
to do so.1

It is an abuse of discretion to not order a separate

trial on a specific issue where the separate trial would result
in convenience and economy of time for the parties, witnesses,
and the court; and where a determination on the separate trial
would end the matter without further proceedings.

Monaco v.

Cecconi, 589 P.2d 156, 160 (Mont. 1979).
The appellant should not have been required to try the issues
of whether the earnest money agreement was enforceable; whether
specific performance could be ordered; and the amount of damages
for breach of contract because of the tremendous inconvenience
and expense to the parties, witnesses and the court.

The cost of

preparing appraisals for the ranch property, which consisted of
several thousand acres, should have been warranted only after the
x

The motion to bifurcate was made prior to the December 1984
trial setting which was continued on respondent's motion for
continuance filed the day of the trial.
(R. 56-57).
Appellant
contends that it was his intent to withdraw the motion only if it
would persuade the court to deny the respondent's motion for
continuance. By allowing the continuance, the motion to bifurcate
was not withdrawn.

8

trial

court

found

the

earnest

money

specific performance not available.

agreement

binding

and

At that point, the appellant

would have known that the expense of preparing appraisals and
using the time of the court, parties and witnesses warranted a
trial solely on the issue of monetary damages for breach of
contract.
The appellant acted appropriately to request a bifurcation and
should not be foreclosed from this Court remanding to the trial
court for a determination of damages if specific performance is
not ordered in whole or part.
POINT IV
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT IS LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE
AND DOES NOT FAIL FOR LACK OF DEFINITENESS.
The earnest money agreement entered into and executed by the
appellant

and

the

respondents

on

April

21,

1980, with

the

committal words "Agreed to above", constituted a legally binding
contract.

A meeting of the minds was reached between the parties

as evidenced by those words and by the language of the agreement
which was set forth with reasonable certainty so that the parties
knew what was required of them.

Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374

(Utah

minds

1980).

Meeting

of

the

or

mutual

assent

objectively determined from the words of the contract.
It is well established in the law that unexpressed
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract.
The rule of law is as was stated in Allen v. Bissenae
and Company. 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980)]:
The apparent mutual assent of the parties,
essential to the formation of a contract,

is

must be gathered by the language employed by
them, and the law imputes to a person an
intention corresponding to the reasonable
meaning of its words and acts. It judges of
his intentions by his outward expressions
and excludes all questions in regard to his
unexpressed intention. If the words or acts
judged by a reasonable standard manifest an
intention to agree to the matter in question,
that agreement is established and it is
immaterial what may
be
the
real but
unexpressed state of his mind upon the
subj ect.
Jaramillo v. Farmers Insurance Group. 669 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1983).
The respondents contention that they did not intend to enter
into a final binding contract is not expressed anywhere in the
earnest money agreement, hence their alleged unexpressed intentions should not affect the validity of the agreement.
The

terms

of

the

earnest

money

agreement

describing

the

subject matter of the agreement were set forth in sufficient
definiteness to make the agreement legally enforceable and in
compliance with the statute of frauds.

The description of the

properties was not so indefinite as to render the agreement
unenforceable.

A legal description was not used to describe the

properties, however, the law does not require a legal description
of the subject matter of an earnest money agreement in order for
it to be enforceable and for it to comply with the statute of
frauds.

Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d at 1374.

In Reed, the earnest money agreement described the property as
the

"corner

determined

of Hillview
that

the

and

earnest

Ninth
money

10

East".
agreement

The trial
was

court

too vague,

incomplete, and ambiguous for enforcement by a decree of specific
performance

and

further

enforceable

contract.

found
On

that

appeal,

it
the

was
Utah

not

a

legally

Supreme

Court

determined that any ambiguity in the language used to describe
the property could be improved through extrinsic evidence.

A

review of the trial record indicated that extrinsic evidence made
it clear that "everyone connected with the deal knew what land
was involved", Id. at 1378, hence the property description viewed
with extrinsic evidence presented at trial did not render the
contract

unenforceable

performance.

or

preclude

an

order

for

specific

Describing the maxim that allows for extrinsic

evidence, the Court stated:
In reviewing the written agreement evidencing the
contract, and any ambiguity inherent in the language
used, extrinsic evidence may be considered by the
court to delineate the intent of the parties and the
enforceability of the contract.
Thus, courts are
provided a means by which they can look beyond the
terms found in the written agreement to ascertain the
intent of the contracting parties.
If from this
examination, of the transaction the courts determine
the actual contract is certain and the obligation and
rights of the parties defined, then they may employ
their equitable powers to enforce the contract via
specific performance.
Id., at 1377.
Application
description

of

the

maxim

set

forth

of the Francis property

and

in Reed

renders

the

the Barker property

sufficiently definite so that the earnest money agreement is
legally enforceable and capable of enforcement by an order for
partial specific performance.

The Francis property described in
11

the earnest money agreement as "Howard Francis and Larry Francis
Ranch in Nine Mile Canyon11 was known to all parties involved in
the

transaction.

Francis1

Extrinsic

evidence

demonstrated

that

the

desired to sell the entire ranch which was the only

ranch they owned in Nine Mile Canyon (Tr. 63; 337; 363).

Mr.

Barker had spent a day inspecting the ranch and reviewing a map
of it hence everyone knew what property entailed the Nine Mile
Ranch.

(Tr. 64)

property.

The same analysis follows with the Barker farm

It was described as "80 acres near Wellington, Utah",

however, extrinsic evidence indicated that all the parties knew
exactly what land was involved.

Mr. Barker took Mr. Olson to the

location of the 80 acres and explicitly told him and showed him
the boundaries for the 80 acres.

(Tr. 80; 216). Roger Olson, as

the agent for the Francis •, relayed the information to them so
they

knew

exactly

what

in the transaction.

80

acres

of

farm

(Tr. 30; 195-196; 376).

land

was

involved

A broker may act

for both parties and that charges each principal with notice of
facts he acquires.
1974).

Foster v. Blake Heights, 53 0 P.2d 815 (Utah

Furthermore, Howard Francis went to the Barker farm in

the company of Mr. Olson and personally inspected the farm near
April 21, 1980.

(Tr. 34). Never did the Francis1 complain that

the farm had been misrepresented nor did they attempt to rescind
for that reason.
Reed v. Alvey, supra supports the appellant's position that
the trial

court was

correct when

12

it held

the earnest money

agreement legally enforceable since the material terms of the
agreement

were

sufficiently

definite

or

could

be

sufficiently definite through extrinsic evidence.

rendered

The decision

further supports the appellant's view that the earnest money
agreement satisfied the statute of frauds requirement that a
writing describe the property.

This court should follow the

reasoning in Reed to hold the earnest money agreement enforceable
in the case at hand.
The Oregon Supreme Court in Hiaains v. Insurance Company of
North America. 256 Or. 151, 469 P.2d 766, 769 (1970) upheld an
earnest

money

agreement

that

"description to be furnished.
in

title

policy."

enforceable

contract

The

described

property

as

North 70 degrees of description

court

since

the

held

evidence

the

agreement

introduced

at

was

the

an

trial

indicated that both parties understood what land was involved,
hence

the

property

was

sufficiently

identified

to

support

upholding the contract.
The two Utah Supreme Court decisions urged by the respondents
as applicable to this case are clearly distinguishable.

In

Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967), it was
never made certain to both parties which 30 acres out of the 189
acres

owned

plaintiff.

by

the

defendant

were

to

be

conveyed

to

the

The facts indicated that the defendant never pin-

pointed the exact 30 acres to the plaintiff, unlike Mr. Barker
who explicitly showed Mr. Olson, the Francis1 agent, which 80
13

acres he intended to be part of the agreement.

Furthermore, in

Pitcher, the contract indicated it was not intended to be a final
agreement.

The writing stated

H

. . . a final contract of sale

which shall be on or before May 1, 1962 . . .."

On its face, the

agreement was not intended to be a final and binding contract,
unlike the case at hand.
Davis v. Robbins. 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973) is
distinguishable for similar reasons.

In Davis the earnest money

agreement stated in clear terms that the location and description
of the land to be conveyed by the vendor to the vendee was
subject to the future agreement of the parties.
stated:

"...

Their contract

less any acreage reserved by the seller.

Offer

contingent upon buyer's approval of net acreage description . .
."

The seller had the right to adjust the amount of land he

wanted to sell and the buyer had the right to accept or reject
it.

A final agreement had not been reached between the parties.

Furthermore,

the

exact

land

to

be

conveyed

identified and was not known to the parties.

had

not

been

Davis, obviously

differs from the case at hand since Mr. Barker's 80 acres was
identified and known to all parties as was the Francis ranch
property.
The fact that the earnest money agreement provided that the
Francis' had the right to select and retain 40 acres from the
summer range of the ranch property does not render the agreement
unenforceable for lack of certainty.

14

The rule of law in Utah has

been for many years that a contract is valid and enforceable
which provides that one party may select a tract of land from a
larger tract that is described in the contract.

Calder v. Third

District Judicial Court, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 (1954).

The

Francis1 sole right to select the 40 acres they desired to retain
from the ranch property left nothing more to the future agreement
of the parties.

The time for selection would be deemed to be a

reasonable time after entering the contract.

Nixon and Nixon,

Inc. v. John New and Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982).
No principal of equity demands that all terms of a contract be
set forth in writing because the law makes-certain or complete by
presumption, rule, or custom and usage.

Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d

at 1378.
The trial court correctly ruled that the earnest money agreement was a legally enforceable contract.

The material terms of

the agreement were set forth in sufficient definiteness to enable
the agreement to be enforceable and to comply with the statute of
frauds.

The respondents' arguments fail to consider the Reed

decision which allows for extrinsic evidence to clarify ambiguous
earnest money

agreement terms.

Furthermore, the respondents

self-serving contentions that they never intended to make the
earnest money agreement a binding final contract carry little
weight when their intentions were not stated in the agreement.
This Court should find that a legally binding contract existed
between the parties.
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POINT V
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT WAS NOT RENDERED
UNENFORCEABLE WHEN CLOSING DID NOT OCCUR
ON OR AFTER MAY 1, 1980.
The earnest money agreement was not rendered unenforceable
because the parties did not close on May 1, 1980, the date
specified in the agreement.

The general rule of law is that time

is not of the essence in contracts for the sale of land.

Cahoon

v. Cahoon. 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982).
The general rule with regard to contracts for the sale
of land is that time is not of the essence unless
parties expressly indicate otherwise or the circumstances surrounding the transaction necessarily imply
that the parties intended timeliness of performance to
be of paramount concern.
Id., at 144.
When a contract does not disclose that time is of the essence,
the contract obligations can continue for some time beyond the
agreed closing date.
645 P.2d

52

Century 21 All Western Real Estate v. Webb,

(Utah 1982); Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d

1124

(Utah

1977) .
In the case at hand, nowhere in the earnest money agreement
does it state that time is of the essence.

Furthermore, the

circumstances surrounding the transaction do not imply that May
1, 1980 was intended to be a firm closing date.
concern to rush a closing

There was no

in order to meet spring planting

schedules because Mr. Barker had specifically provided in the
earnest money agreement that he was going to retain the use of
the farm throughout the 1980 growing season.
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At lines 21-22 in

the agreement it reads, "Seller [Francis] agree to give use of
the 80 acres near Wellington to the buyer [Barker] until Oct.,
1980."

(Ex. 1).

Thus, neither the contract provisions nor the

attendant circumstances indicate that time was of the essence and
that the transaction had to close on May 1, 1980.
The

respondents

are

foreclosed

from

contending

that

the

earnest money agreement is unenforceable because the appellant
did not tender performance on the closing date or thereafter
because the respondents, themselves, were unable to close on May
1, 1980, or anytime thereafter.

Howard Francis admitted in his

deposition that the closing would not be accomplished by May 1
and Mr. Barker was advised of that fact by Roger Olson.
Francis Deposition, pp. 25-26; Tr. 198).

(Howard

Testimony at trial

established that the Francis1, by instructions to Roger Olson,
ordered the work on their title documents stopped a short time
after the closing date past because they had second thoughts
about the transaction.

(Tr. 36; 338-340).

The rule of law is

that a party to a contract does not obtain an advantage from the
fact that he himself is unable to perform.

Huck v. Hayes, 560

P.2d at 1126.
It is fundamental that a party to a contract should
obtain no advantage from the fact that himself is
unable to perform.
Since the defendant had not come
forth
with
the
agreed
title
insurance
policy
demonstrating that he could convey a clear and marketable title as of the proposed closing date, March 8,
1974, he could neither demand payment by the plaintiff
on that date, nor claim that the latter was in default
for failing to make the payment.
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In Huck, the plaintiff buyer and defendant seller entered into
an earnest money agreement

that provided the defendant would

furnish marketable title and title insurance to the plaintiff on
the closing date.

When that date arrived, the defendant was

unable to provide marketable title and so informed the plaintiff.
Since the defendant was unable to perform, the plaintiff did not
offer to perform at that time.

After the title problems were

resolved, one and one-half months later, the defendant refused to
close and tried to justify his refusal on the plaintiff's failure
to tender performance on the closing date.

The court refused to

accept the defendant's defense since he himself was unable to
perform on the closing date and ordered specific performance of
the agreement.
For another decision supporting appellant's position, see Leaf
v. Codd, 41 Idaho 547, 240 P. 593 (1925) ("[t]he vendor, to make
the plaintiff's delay available as a defense, must have performed
or have been ready and willing to perform all the terms of the
contract stipulated for on his part.")
The respondents may not claim, as the defendant in Huck vainly
attempted, that the earnest money agreement is unenforceable and
void because Mr. Barker did not tender performance on the May 1
closing date or thereafter, since the respondents themselves were
unable to close on May 1 or anytime thereafter.

The appellant

was ready, willing, and able to tender performance and close the
transaction at or near May 1, however, his actions would have

18

been useless and futile.
closing

date

did

not

(Tr. 162-163).
render

the

Passing the May 1

earnest

money

agreement

unenforceable.
POINT VI
THE APPELLANT DID TENDER PERFORMANCE NEVERTHELESS
HE WAS EXCUSED FROM TENDERING PERFORMANCE
PRIOR TO BRINGING SUIT.
The appellant tendered performance prior to bringing suit when
Mr. Jensen, his counsel, contacted the Francis1 and stated his
clients willingness and ability to close the transaction by June
10, 1980.

(Tr. 222, Ex. 5 ) . Notwithstanding appellant's tender

of performance, it is the rule of law that an action for specific
performance may be maintained without tendering performance if
the plaintiff had an excuse for not tendering performance.

Reed

v. Alvev. 610 P.2d at 1374.
Generally, in a suit for specific performance of a
contract for the sale of realty, the purchaser must
show that he paid the purchase price, or tendered it,
to the defendant prior to the commencement of the
suit. Howeyer, an action for specific performance may
also be maintained if the plaintiff presents an excuse
for his failure to make such payment or tender and
avers his ability, readiness and willingness to pay
the contract amount.
The plaintiff's ability and willingness to
tender the purchase amount as averred in his complaint
is sufficient to support a suit
for specific
performance of the contract. . . .
Reed at 1379.
Mr.

Barker was excused

from tendering

performance

to the

Francis because they had clearly indicated to him that they would
not

accept

it and

they would
19

not complete

the transaction.

(Testimony of Howard Francis Tr. 36; Ex. 6, Ex. 7, Ex. 9, Ex.
14) .

It

is sufficient

that Mr. Barker pled he was ready,

willing, and able to tender performance.

(R. 42-45).

Although

he did actually tender performance as herein explained, he was
not required to actually tender performance before bringing suit
because it would have been a useless act.

The Utah Supreme Court

in Thomas v. Johnson, 55 Utah 424, 186 P. 437 (1919), stated:
It is a basic premise of equity that the law will
never compel a person to do that which is vain or
useless.
It

is well

established

that

a plaintiff

is excused

from

tendering performance prior to bringing suit when the defendant
has indicated that the tender would not be accepted.

Wolianski

v. Miller, 661 P.2d 1145 (Ariz. App. 1983); Alk v. Lanini. 656
P.2d 367 (Or. App. 1982); Chandler v. Independent School District
No. 12, 625 P.2d 620 (Okl. 1981).
In Alk v. Laney, supra. the plaintiff buyers entered into an
earnest

money

defendant

agreement

owners.

When

for

the

the

purchase

defendants

of

land

could

with

not

the

obtain

marketable title by the closing date, the parties entered into an
agreement

to

extend

the

closing

prosecuted a quiet title action.
was

resolved,

the

plaintiffs

date

while

the

defendants

After the quiet title action

attempted

to

proceed

with

the

transaction, however, the defendants indicated they no longer
wanted to sell.

Several months thereafter, the plaintiffs placed

a down payment in escrow and brought an action for specific
performance.

The trial court ruled that they had not made a
20

timely
the

tender

court

and

reversed

denied
and

specific
held

a

performance.
purchaser

On appeal,

need

not

tender

performance when the seller has indicated that the tender would
not be accepted.

An order of specific performance was entered.

A purchaser need not tender performance in order to
preserve his right to specific performance when the
seller has repudiated the contract, or has otherwise
indicated that tender would not be accepted. . . .
We
hold that the plaintiffs were not required to make a
useless tender of down payment amount and that the
absence of tender did not forfeit the plaintiff's
right to demand specific performance.
Id. at 370.
In the case at hand, the appellant's tender of performance was
established at trial by his testimony, Mr. Jensen's testimony,
and by the introduction into evidence of Mr. Jensen's letter to
the Francis', his deed for the sale of the farm land and his bill
of sale for the water stock.
and 30) .

(Tr. 163; 167; 222; Exhibits 5; 29;

His efforts to secure the mineral rights to the land

would have enabled him to convey those interests.
242-243; 253).

(Tr. 213;

Although the appellant tendered performance, he

was not required to do so prior to bringing suit because the
Francis' would not have accepted it.

As such, he is not fore-

closed from seeking an order for specific performance.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE
APPELLANT WAS PROPER.
The trial court's award of attorney's fees to the appellant
was proper since he was the prevailing party in his action for
enforcement

of

the

earnest

money
21

agreement.

His

right

to

attorney's fees is set forth in the agreement on lines 45-46
which reads:

"If either party fails so to do, he agrees to pay

all expenses of enforcing this agreement, or of any right arising
out of the breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's
fee."
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the appellant had the
right to receive an award for attorney's fees.
properly made
rights.

an award based

The trial court

on the appellant's

contractual

It is well established that Utah follows the rule that

attorney's fees may be awarded if provided by contract.

Turtle

Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982).
The amount the trial court awarded the appellants as reasonable attorney's fees rested within its discretion and should not
be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
Turtle, supra; Yreka United, Inc. v. Harrison, 510 P.2d 775 (Id.
1973).

It is not an abuse of discretion to make an attorney's

fees award that exceeds the amount recovered

on a contract.

Lanier v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 694 P. 2d 625
1985).

(Utah

In Lanier, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed an attorney's

fees award of $19,000 in a contract dispute involving a recovery
of $11,350.

Holding that the attorney's fees were not limited by

the damage award, the court stated:
The total amount of the attorney's fees awarded in
this case can not be said to be unreasonable just
because it is greater than the amount recovered in the
contract. The amount of the damages awarded in a case
does not place a necessary limit on the amount of
attorney's fees that can be awarded.
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Furthermore, contrary to the appellant's contention
that attorney's fees should be determined on the basis
of an equitable standard, attorney's fees, when
awarded as allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of
legal right.
Id. at 625.
Additionally, in Lanier the Court stated that an award for
reasonable

attorney's

fees

is not

set

by what

the

attorney

actually bills nor the number of hours spent on the case.

The

trial judge may consider other factors, such as the provisions of
the

Utah

Code

of

Professional

Responsibility

DR2-106,

to

establish a reasonable attorney's fees award.
A court may consider, among other factors, the
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee
customarily charged and the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the case and the
result obtained, and the expertise and experience of
the attorneys involved.
Id. at 625.
The trial court, in the case at hand, properly took these
matters into consideration when it established the amount of the
attorney's fees it awarded to the appellant.

His ruling was not

an abuse of discretion, but rather represented

an award the

appellant was entitled to by contractual right and verified by an
affidavit

and

other documentation

counsel for the appellant.

submitted

to

the court by

All attorney's fees and expenses went

toward enforcing the earnest money agreement and the appellant's
rights for breach thereof, as provided in the agreement, hence,
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he is entitled to recover them as the prevailing party in this
action.
CONCLUSION
This court should rule that the earnest money agreement was a
binding legal contract and that an appropriate remedy for the
respondents' breach of contract is partial specific performance.
The appellant's land and water stock should be exchanged for
$600,000.
this

court

In the event specific performance may not be ordered,
should

remand

to

the

trial

court

for

a

damage

determination.
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